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Revisiting the Invisible Hiding Place
Jasper Coppes
Buried under all the mute experiences are those 
unseen that give our life its from, colour and its 
melody.
Buried under all the mute places are those unseen 
that give our life its form, colour and its melody...1
Preface
It seems important first of all to mention that this text 
is written with an awareness of the fact that most 
sources are misinterpreted and that all subsequent 
statements are based on confusion and there-
fore contain no scientific validity. The process has 
actually been initiated by my interest in this confu-
sion, like digging up memories of which you were 
unaware they even existed because they were so 
long forgotten and therefore now you can’t even 
be sure that they are really your memories at all. 
Besides this assumption I hope that my naivety 
towards the subjects posed, will give way to new 
forms of perception towards those subjects. 
 I have tried to deal with questions that arose 
during my practice as a visual art student at the 
Gerrit Rietveld academy. Accordingly this text can 
be read as a theoretical and literary inquiry, investi-
gating those subjects I see myself confronted with 
in my artistic practice. The subject that has been of 
premier interest to me here is the concept of place. 
Therefore I will start this paper with an attempt to 
clarify ideas about the content of this subject. In 
resonance to the content of the concept of place the 
text continues to follow the spaces in and around 
place. Its purpose is to develop a position towards 
the construction of these spaces, and how they 
have been formed by thought and theory until now. 
Moreover my intention is to introduce ideas about 
the impossibility and the desire of inhabiting an 
empty place. For maybe the empty place resists 
any attempt to understand it, even the conception 
of it being a place, and becomes a dimension of 
absence that unlocks a door to the wilderness, to 
unlimited space.
Introduction
A couple of weeks ago I decided to break away the 
wall that divided my apartment up in two. The wall 
on which I used to project my thoughts is now gone, 
which gives me space to let those thoughts take off 
through the window. The place where my writing 
desk used to be, against the wall, is now replaced 
by the dinner table and even though it would make 
more sense to keep writing at the writing desk, I find 
myself attached to its former location, which means 
I now write at the dinner table, which is empty; 
leaving open spaces for possibility, for change, and 
for a transformation in the negotiations between 
invention and reality.
 Being present in one’s intimate surroundings 
thus brings forth the realisation that the ordinary is a 
field of potential and of possibility; a field of possible 
meaning. Or better, the ambiguous space which, as 
Benjamin writes, ‘opens up to him as a landscape, 
even  as it closes around him as a room.’2
 As for instance Georges Perec shows us in his 
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book Species of Spaces and other Pieces,3 the 
spatial settings of our intimate surroundings are 
what gives ground to the meaningful memories of 
the experiences with which we link our sense of self. 
Works such as Species of Spaces and other Pieces 
make us aware of our desire to render visible, 
readable and desirable the chaotic space of the 
ordinary; the apparent shutting off of oneself into the 
private realm, to bring together geographic zones of 
meaning, reinventing them each time, without ever 
imposing a single one of them; to move toward a 
multiplicity of emotions, between the constructed 
and the yet-to-be-constructed, between the mapped 
and the not-yet mapped. 
 On the subject of space itself Perec writes: 
‘I would like there to exist places that are stable, 
unmoving, intangible, untouched and almost 
untouchable, unchanging, deep rooted; places that 
might be points of reference, of departure, of origin’. 
But he continues: ‘Such places don’t exist, and it’s 
because they don’t exist that space becomes a 
question, ceases to be self-evident, ceases to be 
incorporated, ceases to be appropriated. Space is 
a doubt: I have constantly to mark it, to designate it. 
It’s never mine, never given to me, I have to conquer 
it’.4
 While the world offers itself before me, sitting 
here at my table, completely quiet and alone, I notice 
the difficulty I have in picturing how it could ever be 
conquered. But I agree with Perec that, ‘I don’t think 
I was wasting my time in trying to go beyond this 
improbable limit. The effort itself seemed to produce 
something that might be a statue of the inhabita-
ble’.5
When I consider my thoughts and the space 
before me to be reflections of each other, I imagine 
they are set in an area quite reminiscent of a 
description of an imaginary city, which the author 
named Valdrada, with its reflection in the lake that 
surrounds it. Valdrada and its reflection ‘live for each 
other, their eyes interlocked; but there is no love 
between them’.6 Maybe there is no love because 
there is no will to conquer, no desire to inhabit; 
which, metaphorically, gives reason and room for 
my will and desire to at least make an attempt. 
Next time I’m here I’ll really be there 
To live is to live locally, and to know is first of all to 
know the place one is in.7
All the empty places, abandoned or unknown terri-
tory, are part of the landscape. We do not inhabit the 
landscape; we merely dwell in it with our gaze. This 
might explain why I enjoy looking at empty places 
so much. 
 Tuesday morning, the 26th of November (my 
mother’s birthday), 1984, I am crouched under-
neath the closet. In front of me the wooden floor 
on which I learned to walk uphill, since our house 
bent forward so much, that there was a ten percent 
altitude difference between the front and the back of 
the living room. In my memory I look up from under-
neath the closet, towards the light entering through 
the balcony window, filling up the empty living-room 
with a warm, familiar glow. 
 There is something about the way we memorise 
the surroundings of where our experiences take 
place. Maybe these spatial settings are what give 
ground to those meaningful memories of the experi-
ences with which we link our sense of self. But what 
are those spatial settings and in what way do they 
shape our experience? 
 The purpose of this paper is to examine the 
concept of place and its centrality to both geogra-
phy and everyday life. 
 The place I grew up in became a place where 
my childhood memories are kept safe. There is a 
place in my attic where I have put aside, in a box, 
the pictures of that time. Also I keep in mind the 
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possibility that some day the place where I live now 
will end up in that same box, in the attic of my new 
home.
 Our world is built up out of places we live 
in, places we travel in between and places we 
discover. In our practical everyday lives we organ-
ise our experiences of the world to be able to know, 
differentiate and respond to these various places. 
In itself this practical knowledge of places is quite 
superficial and based mainly on the explicit func-
tions that places have for us. That there is a deeper 
significance of place is apparent in the way we feel 
connected to certain places, for example; feeling at 
home, being homesick or feeling nostalgic about 
a place.8 In defining the development of place, we 
could start by saying that primarily it is a focus in 
space, it has a location, a site, a here or a there. It 
would be meaningless to imagine any happening or 
experience without reference to a locality, although 
with place we mean more than just a certain loca-
tion. When describing a place we think of the totality 
made up of concrete parts, each having substance, 
shape, texture and colour. Only together do these 
things determine the full character or atmosphere 
of a place. A place is therefore a qualitative, total 
phenomenon, which we cannot reduce to any of its 
parts or properties without losing its concrete char-
acter.9 The character of a place expresses itself 
in these appearances. Through the appearances 
we are able to experience a place, and inscribe it 
with experience. Subsequently we can define place 
by the production/formation of it, and the way we 
approach or experience it. Heidegger illustrates 
the problem of formation by means of the bridge; a 
building which visualises, symbolises and gathers, 
and makes the environment become a unified 
whole. He explains how a bridge brings together 
the riverbanks and the landscape behind it, it brings 
them into each other’s neighbourhood. Heidegger 
also describes what the bridge gathers together 
and thereby uncovers its value as a symbol. Before, 
the meaning of the landscape was hidden, and the 
building of the bridge brings it out into the open. The 
bridge gathers being into a certain location that we 
may call a place. This place however did not exist as 
an entity before the bridge, but comes-to-presence 
with and as the bridge. The existential purpose of 
building (forming place) is therefore to make a site 
become a place, that is, to uncover the meanings 
potentially present in the given environment. Here 
place is deeply metaphysical and a long way from 
the distinction between one location and another. 
It is a-way-of-being in the world, or Dasein. In 
describing how we come to this Dasein, Heidegger 
uses the terms building and dwelling. To ‘dwell’ is 
derived from the old Norse dvelia, which means 
to linger or remain. Heidegger related the German 
wohnen to bleiben and sich aufhalten. He points 
out that the Gothic wunian meant ‘to be at peace’, 
‘to remain in peace’. The German word for peace, 
Friede, means to be free. That is, protected from 
harm and danger. According to these linguistic rela-
tionships, Heidegger shows that ‘dwelling means 
to be at peace in a protected place’. Furthermore 
the Old English and High German word for build-
ing, buan means to dwell, and it is intimately related 
to the verb to be. Building is inherently related to 
dwelling; both are connected to being. A properly 
authentic being-in-the-world to Heidegger is one 
rooted in place. As a main example of rootedness, 
Heidegger chooses his farmhouse in the forest. It is 
relatively straightforward to portray such a place, a 
very romantic and nostalgic image, as rooted as if 
in the soil. Not surprisingly, dwelling, to Heidegger, 
is a highly poetic form of being. ‘Poetry is what 
brings man into the earth, making him belong to 
it, and thus brings him into dwelling’.10 The relation 
between dwelling and poetry becomes most visible 
in the work of Bachelard. In The Poetics of Space 
he gathers, visualises and symbolises the way in 
which place has gained meaning through poetry, 
using many examples to depict our physical and 
mental relationship to places.11 Alphonso Lingus 
provides a simple example of this by showing how 
the active body connects a certain region of alien 
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reality to its own body: 
My bed was, the first night, crisp and brittle, foreign; 
little by little it has become intimate. It has acquired 
a very decided and very obvious fleshy texture; as 
I lie enveloped with it I no longer distinguish where 
my body leaves off and where an alien surface 
begins…. The intimacy of the flesh diffuses through-
out the whole bed-sheet, finally into the bed itself, 
and the room also by a sort of contagion. They have 
become incorporated.12
 
Not surprisingly it is the same subject, being incorpo-
rated, which Merleau-Ponty depicts as the essence 
of our relationship with the perceptible world as 
such. In The Visible and the Invisible he writes: 
The body unites us directly to the things through its 
own ontogenesis, by welding to one another the two 
outlines of which it is made, its two laps: the sensi-
ble mass it is and the mass of the sensible wherein 
it is born by segregation and upon which, as seer, it 
remains open. It is the body and it alone, because it 
is a two dimensional being, that can bring us to the 
things themselves, which are themselves not flat 
beings but beings in depth, inaccessible to a subject 
that would survey it from above, open to him alone 
that, if it be possible, would coexist with them in the 
same world.13
We are able to perceive the physical world because 
we are part of it and by physically coexisting in it we 
have access to its depth. 
 Merleau-Ponty goes on stating that the visibility 
that is created does neither belong to the body qua 
fact nor to the world qua fact, since each is only 
the rejoinder of the other. They form a couple, the 
couple more real than either of them alone.
Thus since the seer is caught up in what he sees 
(a mirror placed in front of a mirror), it is still himself 
he sees: there is a fundamental narcissism of all 
vision. And thus, for the same reason, the vision 
he exercises, he also undergoes from the things, 
such that, as for example Lacan also states: ‘I feel 
myself looked at by the things’, my activity is equally 
passivity - which is the second and more profound 
sense of the narcissism; not to see the outside, as 
the others see it, but especially to be seen by the 
outside. To exist within it, to emigrate into it, to be 
seduced, captivated, alienated by the phantom, 
so that the seer and the visible correspond to one 
another and we no longer know which sees and 
which is seen.14
When brought in relation to the concept of place 
(the direct perceptible one is surrounded with); to 
be in a place is to emigrate into it. 
 The question remains: how does this existential 
exercise in ‘seeing and being seen’ have reper-
cussions on our understanding of where we are? 
What do we emigrate into? Developing Heidegger’s 
concept of dwelling, Edward Relph seeks to escape 
from simplistic notions of place as location. Location, 
to Relph, is not a necessary or sufficient condition 
of place. He works through a list of characteris-
tics of place including: their visuality, the sense of 
community that place supposedly engenders, the 
sense of time involved in establishing attachment 
to place and the value of ‘rootedness’, but none of 
these, he argues, can suffice to explain the deeper 
importance of place to human existence and experi-
ence. In defining the essence of place, he states: 
‘The basic meaning of place, its essence, does not 
come from locations, nor from trivial functions that 
places serve, nor from the community that occupies 
it, nor from superficial and mundane experiences 
-- though these are all common and perhaps neces-
sary aspects of places. The essence of place lies in 
the largely unselfconscious intentionality that defines 
places as profound centers of human existence’.15 
As Gabriel Marcel has summarised it simply: ‘An 
individual is not distinct from his place; he is that 
place’.16 Then, to emigrate into place might mean to 
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emigrate into oneself. 
 In the effort to become one with place, Relph 
makes the distinction between the experience of 
insideness and outsideness. ‘To be inside a place 
is to belong to it and identify with it, and the more 
profoundly inside you are the stronger is the identity 
with the place’.17 We become insiders through an 
authentic attitude. For Relph, authenticity means a 
genuine and sincere attitude: ‘As a form of exist-
ence authenticity consists of a complete awareness 
and acceptance of responsibility for your own exist-
ence’.18 For Relph, as such, place is a centre of 
meaning and a field for care. ‘An in-authentic atti-
tude to place’, Relph states, ‘is essentially no sense 
of place, it is merely an attitude which is socially 
convenient and acceptable, a stereotype … it can 
be adopted without real involvement’.19 Inauthentic 
places are seen as ‘flatscape’, lacking intentional 
depth and only providing possibilities for common-
place and mediocre experiences.20 These places 
are new, quickly made, distant and unconnected 
to their environment. Relph blames mainly tourism, 
as ‘it encourages the disneyfication, museumiza-
tion, and futurization of places.’ The same example 
of disneyfication is used by Baudrillard. According 
to him, Disneyland is presented as imaginary in 
order to make us believe that the rest is real, it is 
a machine set p in order to rejuvenate in reverse 
the fiction of the real.21 Baudrillard depicts the world 
we experience as real as the result of a fictional 
construction without an original.22
 To Relph, Disneyworld represents the epitome 
of what he calls placeless-ness, as it is constructed 
purely for outsiders. He uses this term to describe a 
place that has no special relationship to the places 
in which it is located -- it could be anywhere. Realis-
ing that modern-day society is full of these placeless 
places, it seems typical to think of reality and authen-
ticity to be elsewhere; in other historical periods 
and cultures, in purer, simpler lifestyles. But just as 
Nietzsche observed that truth can come from error 
or good from evil, it is recognised that authenticity 
may come from inauthenticity or vice versa, and 
that these two modes of experience are not always 
clearly differentiable. The two phenomena pervade 
the creation and experience of the modern environ-
ment. On the one hand, there is a growing amount 
of places, buildings and things that are commonly 
called fake or inauthentic - for example, plastic 
flowers, false shutters, staged tourist environments, 
pseudo-vernacular buildings, and mock woodwork. 
On the other hand, there is a strong cultural trend 
involving a search for an authenticity, which seems 
to be missing in these examples, a desire to have the 
‘real’ thing and to deride any synthesised substitute. 
Authenticity cannot be created through the manipu-
lation or purification of form, since authenticity is 
the very source from which form gains meaning.23 
Here Dovey argues that replication stems from the 
attempt to preserve or create a shared meaning, 
using a prop that has lost its role in everyday life; 
that the phenomenon of fakery is essentially a repli-
cation of meaning. As such inauthenticity emerges 
out of the very attempt to retain or regain authentic-
ity.24 The replica then, is an attempt to preserve a 
particular construction of meaning at a certain time, 
in a certain place, and accordingly will eventually 
continue to remain a mark of that moment and not 
of the imitated thing itself. As such the replica is in 
fact an impossibility, for what is created with the 
intention to imitate becomes a new form, which is 
not in any way related to what it tries to imitate. 
 Where Relph makes a connection between inau-
thenticity and placeless-ness, anthropologist Marc 
Augé replaces ‘placelessness’ with ‘non-place’. By 
non-places Augé is referring to sites marked by the 
‘fleeting, the temporal and ephemeral’. Non-places 
include freeways, airports, supermarkets –sites 
where particular histories and traditions are not 
relevant–, unrooted places marked by mobility and 
travel. Inauthenticity is found within mobility. Mobility 
here can be seen as a mark of all life in an increas-
ingly accelerated world.25
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The same traces of movement, speed and circula-
tion are depicted by Nigel Thrift as characteristic of 
the modern world. Thrift’s focus is on these ‘almost 
places’. In Baudrillardean terms, it would mean a 
world of third-order simulacra, where pseudo-places 
have finally advanced to eliminate places altogether. 
Finally, one might read them as frames for varying 
practices of space, time and speed.26
 He concludes with saying that the implicit moral 
judgements of inauthenticity and lack of commit-
ment are gone, but just as place appears to be 
more or less irrelevant, it seems to be a present-
day subject. Place has become sentimentalised 
and commercialised, we are encouraged to get to 
know places and to protect the loss of places. Many 
urban dwellers leave the city to look for a place in 
the country where life will slow down.
 Lucy Lippard has also reflected on what place 
might mean in the speeded-up world we inhabit. 
Lippard suggests that mobility and place go hand in 
hand as places are always already hybrid anyway. 
By moving through, between and around them we 
are simply adding to the mix. She suggests that, ‘the 
pull of place continues to operate in all of us as the 
geographical component of the psychological need 
to belong somewhere, one antidote to a prevailing 
alienation’. Even in the age of ‘restless, multitradi-
tional people’, she argues, and ‘even as the power 
of place is diminished and often lost, it continues 
–as an absence– to define culture and identity. It 
also continues –as a presence– to change the way 
we live’.27 Most of us ‘move around a lot’, Lippard 
continues, ‘but when we move we come into contact 
with those who haven’t been moving around or 
have come from different places. This should give 
us a better understanding of difference (though it 
will always be impossible to understand everything 
about difference). Each time we enter a new place, 
we become one of the ingredients of an exist-
ing hybridity, which is really what all ‘local places’ 
consist of’.28 We may conclude that the concept of 
place presumably relies on the symbiosis of locat-
edness and motion rather than the valorisation of 
one or the other.
 A place is thus a configuration of different 
elements that, when together, create a qualitative 
consensus, by which we can say that we are not 
anywhere, or somewhere, but we are in a place. 
Accordingly a place gives us a profound sense of 
‘hereness’, being specifically in a particular place. 
The realisation that ‘this’ is where we are might even 
be independent of the qualitative elements that form 
a place. But if we are not looking at a mix of ingre-
dients that continually changes and continually links 
this place to other places, do we then merely look 
at the anti-manifestation of elsewhere? And if so, 
then what does it mean? Or as Blaise Pascal, the 
renowned 17th century philosopher and mathemati-
cian, has put it beautifully:
Whenever I think of how little space I occupy and 
see this space devoured by the endless immensity 
of the spaces I have no knowledge of and which take 
no notice of me, I become frightened and amazed 
that I am here and not there: there seems to be no 
reason why I should be here instead of there, live 
now instead of then. Who put me here?29
It is this ‘thisness’ that John Duns Scotus has called 
‘haeceitas’, which he defines as a non-qualitative 
property of a substance or thing. It is what is neces-
sary for a thing to be singular. Italo Calvino also 
speaks about the un-qualifiable element of the 
object: 
A stone, a figure, a sign, a word that reaches us 
isolated from its context is only a stone, figure, sign 
or word.: we can try to define them, to describe them 
as they are, and no more than that; whether, beside 
the face they show us, they also have a hidden face, 
it is not for us to know. The refusal to comprehend 
more than what the stones show us is perhaps the 
only way to evince respect for their secret; trying to 
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guess is a presumption, a betrayal of that true, lost 
meaning.30
Of course I have no intention to betray, however, I 
must admit my curiosity towards this lost meaning of 
things. Could there in fact be a similar lost meaning 
of place; a hidden face that can be respected? 
 The problem is that we are incapable of isolat-
ing places from their context, because they usually 
create it. In continuing this search for the indefina-
ble element of place it could perhaps be reasonable 
to turn the opposite direction, to places we know 
very well; intimate space. The place we probably all 
know best is our bed, the elementary space of the 
body, it is the individual space par excellence. We 
spend more than a third of our lives in a bed. Not 
surprisingly, George Perec remarks in Species of 
Spaces and other Pieces that: 
All I need to do, once I’m in bed, is to close my 
eyes and to think with a minimum of application of a 
given place for the bedroom to come instantly back 
into my memory in every detail – the position of the 
doors and windows, the arrangement of the furni-
ture – for me to feel, more precisely still, the almost 
physical sensation of being once again in bed in 
that room.31
Except from the fact that the bed is possibly the 
ultimate place for the re-occurrence of past events 
through memory, it is an exceptionally well-known 
place for events (also for those that move outside of 
reality), but is predominantly an event itself. 
 If we define places in terms of being an event, 
a becoming, we are defining them by their imper-
ceptibility, since movement has an essential relation 
to the imperceptible (its destination is not prefixed); 
it is by nature imperceptible. Perception can grasp 
movement only as the displacement of a moving 
body or the development of a form. Movements, 
becomings, in other words, pure relations of speed 
and slowness, pure affects, are below and above 
the threshold of perception. Does this in fact mean 
that the concept of place has today advanced itself 
to a form of imperceptibility? Is the bed in which I 
close my eyes to the world every night actually an 
invisible field itself? And if places are in this context 
related to the field of the imperceptible, then what 
does imperceptibility actually mean? 
 In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari 
contemplate the relation between the (anorganic) 
imperceptible, the (asignifying) indiscernible, and 
the (asubjective) impersonal:
One has ‘to put everything in to it’: eliminate every-
thing that exceeds the moment, but put in everything 
that includes it - and the moment is not the instan-
taneous, it is the haecceity into which one slips and 
that slips into other haecceities by transparency. To 
be present at the dawn of the world. Such is the 
link between imperceptibility, indiscernibility, and 
impersonality - the three virtues. To reduce oneself 
to an abstract line, a trait, in order to find one’s zone 
of indiscernibility with other traits, and in this way 
to enter the haecceity (the ‘thisness’) and imper-
sonality of the creator. One is then like grass; one 
has made the world, everybody/everything, into a 
becoming, because one has suppressed in oneself 
everything that prevents us from slipping between 
things and growing in the midst of things. One has 
combined ‘everything’: the indefinite article, the infi-
nite-becoming, and proper name to which one is 
reduced. Saturate, eliminate, put everything in.32
So, here, confusingly the ungraspable element of 
perception, invisibility, is defined by being an event 
into which one can emerge by putting everything 
into the moment. Wildly interpreting, this means 
that one slips into the haecceity of one’s direct 
surrounding, becomes indiscernible with the place 
and becomes impersonal towards oneself, by which 
the bed suddenly turns into a horizontal field in 
which energies emerge and disappear, and where 
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connections are made and dismantled. 
 Edward Soja writes of the lived space as inter-
rupting the distinction between perceived space 
and spatial practices. Lived space is not necessar-
ily imperceptible, but it does exist at the threshold 
of what is perceivable and imperceptible. He uses 
the term ‘thirdspace’ to put this area in perspective 
to two other kinds of space. First space is the term 
he uses to describe empirically measurable and 
mappable phenomena. Second space is conceived 
space, space that is subjective and imagined, the 
domain of representations and image. This corre-
sponds to many people’s notion of place, as a felt 
and cared-for centre of meaning. 
Thirdspace as Lived Space is portrayed as multi-
sided and contradictory, oppressive and liberating, 
passionate and routine, knowable and unknowable. 
It is a space of radical openness, a site of resistance 
and struggle, a space of multiplicitous representa-
tions …. It is a meeting ground, a site of hybridity 
… and moving beyond entrenched boundaries, a 
margin or edge where ties can be severed and also 
where new ties can be forged. It can be mapped 
but never captured in conventional cartographies; 
it can be creatively imagined but obtains meaning 
only when practiced and fully lived.33
My neighbour’s home has always felt a lot more 
like a home than the place where I live. She really 
spends time with her apartment, she lives it fully, and 
I must admit I regularly neglect my relationship with 
my own. My home is more like a dreamhouse, in the 
sense that I’m mostly asleep when I’m in it. Which 
also maybe explains why its interior is shaped by 
imagination rather than practicality. Soja underlines 
the idea that,  rather than thinking about places as 
bounded and rooted, we can think of them as open 
and permeable – based on a politics of inclusion 
rather than exclusion. To think of place as an inter-
section – a particular configuration of happenings 
– is to think of place in a constant sense of becom-
ing through practice and practical knowledge. Place 
is both the context for practice – we act according 
to more or less stable schemes of perception – and 
a product of practice, something that only makes 
sense as it is lived. However difficult, I can try to 
picture my home without me, disintegrating into 
someone else’s apartment or through time and 
erosion eventually becoming part of the wilderness. 
The empty apartment does not inhabit itself, but 
returns to its borderless grounds. And probably it’s 
just a matter of time when those grounds are made 
into a place again, into a dwelling shaped by some-
one’s presence, practice and liveliness. Or even by 
someone else’s dreams and subconscious inten-
tions, validating sleep as a proper spatial practice. 
There’s nobody out there, it’s just the noise of 
the wind 
Place can be understood as an embodied relation-
ship with the world. Places are constructed by people 
doing things and in this sense are never finished 
but constantly being performed. In this sense it 
becomes an event rather than a secure ontological 
thing rooted in notions of the authentic. Place as 
an event is marked in openness and change rather 
than boundedness and permanence. Still, there 
remains the question: if to understand place is to 
disappear into it, what do we become then? At the 
core of our presence in a place is the realisation 
that it is something other than us, it is alien to us, for 
its form of existence is different from ours. Still, as I 
have pointed out above, the state of the places we 
are in is entirely dependent on the status of our own 
presence and vise versa. Maybe the inherent other-
ness that lies within the external world is covered up 
by our conventions of it. So, what would happen if 
those borders set by conventional perception disap-
pear? In My Life Without Me Rilke writes:
[S]uddenly, a room with its lamp appeared to me, 
was almost palpable in me. I was already a corner 
in it, but the shutters had sensed me and closed.34
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If a person walking in the street where I live would 
look up to the right at number 22, he or she would 
be able to see my apartment, but not me. Because I 
would be in the back of the room, seated on a moss 
green chair, back towards the balcony window, my 
hands on the dinner table. I put myself, so to speak, 
amongst these things. Or more accurately, I put my 
hands among the things on my table. And just by 
the act of placing my hands on the dinner table, 
among those few things on it, I had configured my 
hands to be part of their world, the world of things. 
My hands are touchable things and contain the 
capacity to touch at the same time; a phenomenon 
very beautifully described by Merleau Ponty in The 
Phenomenology of Perception.35
 Touching one hand with the other hand is a 
phenomenon, Merleau Ponty suggests, that reveals 
to us the two dimensions of our ‘flesh’, that is both 
a form of experience (tactile experience) and some-
thing that can be touched. It is both ‘touching’ and 
‘tangible’. Furthermore, the relationship is revers-
ible: the hand that touches can be felt as touched, 
and vise versa, though never both at the same time, 
and it is this ‘reversibility’ that he picks out as the 
essence of flesh (être sauvage). It shows us the 
ambiguous status of our bodies as both subject 
and object.36 This insight has consequences for the 
truth of all perception, including vision. It is based 
on an account of touch, which needs to be under-
stood not as substitute for vision –as another way 
of measuring the same distances– but rather as the 
fundamental dimension of visuality itself, contrib-
uting to its texture, depth, and thickness. If vision 
is modeled on the tactile experience that the hand 
that touches is also tangible, then seeing, implying 
being seen, necessarily involves the incorporation 
of the seer into the flesh of the world.37
 While we humans, through our corporality, are 
involved in the dialogue between the seer and the 
seen, it is precisely the characteristic of the inhuman, 
the thing, to exist in itself --not for itself--, which 
brings forth the understanding of our human posi-
tion and also the melancholy of being different than 
the things we are surrounded with. In The Tears of 
Things, Peter Schwenger follows this line of thought 
and shows through many examples from varying 
disciplines the connection we have with things. 
Already in the introduction he describes a state of 
being a thing, which is an indifference to the self 
and often accompanied by a foretaste of eternity, 
an eternity experiencsed without the tediousness 
of personality.38 The indifferent character of things 
is beautifully expressed in Wislawa Szymborska’s 
‘View with a Grain of Sand’, a litany that concludes 
as follows: 
The Window has a wonderful view on the lake, 
But the view doesn’t view itself. 
It exists in this world colourless, shapeless, 
Soundless, odourless, and painless. 
The lake’s floor exists floorlessly, and its shore 
shorelesly. 
Its water feels itself neither wet nor dry
And its waves to themselves are neither singular 
nor plural. 
They splash deaf to their own noise 
On pebbles neither large nor small. 
And all this beneath a sky by nature skyless 
In which the sun sets without setting at all 
And hides without hiding behind an unminding 
cloud. 
The wind ruffles it, its only reason being that it 
blows. 
A second passes. A second second. A third.
But they’re three seconds only for us. 
Time has passed like a courier with urgent news. 
But that’s just our simile. 
The character is invented, his haste is make 
believe. 
His news inhuman. 39
Schwenger concludes that the world is one in which 
at the heart of objects is something inhuman, alien, 
other. Yet at the heart of what is human is something 
32
no less inhuman. There may be a drive, a desire for 
this darkness, but it is always accompanied by a 
sense of loss. In Freud’s terms, there is a loss in 
every evolution of consciousness, which splits in 
two what was once one and thus evokes a kind of 
nostalgia for the prior state. The drive toward this 
state is enacted at intervals, but it can never find 
more than momentary rest: ‘One group of instincts 
(the death drive) moves forward so as to reach the 
final aim of life as quickly as possible; but when a 
particular stage in the advance has been reached, 
the other group (the life instincts) jerks back to a 
certain point to make a fresh start and so prolong the 
journey.’40 Thus the death drive repeatedly enacts a 
dynamic of loss. What is lost is not the object but 
our prior state of object-hood, and perception can 
only stress the ways in which this is so.
 The object, as in Merleau Ponty’s philosophy, 
is necessary in order for the subject to be consti-
tuted, as a conscious self that becomes aware of 
its consciousness by contrast with that which is 
not conscious; as Sartre puts it: ‘The (subject) for 
itself constitutes itself as not being the thing’. And 
symmetrically: ‘The thing, before all comparison, 
before all construction, is that which is present to 
consciousness as not being conscious’. This would 
seem to set up the mutual dependence, but the 
object’s indifference makes the dependence entirely 
ours. We seek to apprehend an object’s being, and 
realise at some level that that connection can never 
be made. 
 Yet every moment when this lack of connection 
is realised creates an emotional connection. This 
emotional connection is very different from those 
produced by narratives with which we overlay the 
indifferent object, and which make us feel that 
objects understand us, in a sense are us. The 
connection of which Schwenger is speaking is at the 
same time a sense of surrendering, of loss at the 
very moment of apprehension. And the emotion that 
it produces is melancholy. Emotion as the psychic 
equivalent of motion in the material world.41 On the 
other hand, as soon as we become motionless, we 
are elsewhere; we are dreaming in a world that is 
immense. Indeed, immensity is the movement of 
the motionless man.42
 So, apart from being moved by the material 
world, there might be a state of mind that is open 
to the presence of the world; a state of mind that 
is open to this presence and stays open to it while 
losing one’s personality (since it is not understood 
as an emotion or a personal feeling); a state of mind 
often described as being unoccupied, being empty 
and still. Then, nature might present itself not only 
as the objects constituting it, but also as a living 
presence. The inherent quality of an external object 
can be sensed and becomes one’s sense of self. 
A range of high, rocky mountains can then be felt 
as an immensity, a solidity, an immovability, that is 
alive, that is there. This immensity and immovability 
seems sometimes to confront us, to affect us, not 
as an inanimate object but as a clear and pure pres-
ence. It seems to contact us. And if we are open and 
sensitive, we may participate in its immensity. We 
may then feel ourselves as one with the immensity, 
the immovability, the vastness.43 
 
 Here the presence of the external world is 
something we can participate in. Not only by being 
among it, but also being included in it and includ-
ing it in one’s own sense of presence. The dynamic 
of representation instead involves loss, as Kristeva 
states: ‘it implies an absent object preceding its 
replication (…). If this object is not always physical 
–as for instance art’s object may be a concept of the 
work being executed– it is no less lost in the process 
of the very labor by which it is found, transformed 
into a concrete representation. Art perceives and 
attempts to represent an object that must always 
to some degree be lost in perception and lost again 
in representation’.44 This is not a loss that can be 
mourned, that can be gotten past so one can live 
one’s life: it is that life. 
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Furthermore both mourning and the unpresent-
able seem to take place outside of discourse, that 
is, in silence. Lyotard suggests that ‘silence indi-
cates inevitable gaps in our comprehension, gaps 
that should be respected, rather than bridged’.45 
It is not only silence that suggests the unpresent-
able, but any formulation of absence, as Lyotard 
also observes a similar thread within abstract paint-
ing: ‘The current of abstract painting has its source, 
from 1912, in this requirement for indirect and all but 
ungraspable allusion to the invisible in the visible’.46 
In Lyotard’s experience, the moment of contact 
with the silence of the world of things is defined 
as a moment of terror: ‘One feels that it is possi-
ble that soon nothing more will take place. What is 
sublime is the feeling that something will happen, 
despite everything, within this threatening void, that 
something will take ‘place’ and will announce that 
everything is not over. That place is mere ‘here’, the 
most minimal occurrence’.47  
 One can still imagine though, a nothingness, at 
the threshold of the invisible and the inaudible, that 
is sensible and alive, by which one can say that: 
I can almost hear myself close my eyes, then open 
them.48
The world without me 
There is merely one cause for all of human suffering: 
‘The fact that he is not capable of restfully remaining 
in a room’.49
In the spring of 1790, Xavier Maistre, a twenty-
seven-year-old Frenchman, set about for a journey 
through his bedroom and named the report of 
what he had seen Voyage autour de ma chambre 
(‘journey through my bedroom’). Pleased by his 
experiences he engaged himself in a second travel 
in 1798. This time he was determined to go all 
the way to the windowpane, of which he made a 
report under the title Expedition nocturne autour 
de ma chambre (‘nocturnal expedition through my 
bedroom’).50 Like most people who read Maistre’s 
encouraging suggestions to rediscover the stunning 
beauty of our most regular everyday environment, I 
felt the need to follow his advice, though I consider 
my expeditions not as successful as Maistre’s. Ever 
since, I frequently take much pleasure in trans-
forming my experience of my bedroom into a vast 
landscape. It seems then to develop an experiential 
expansion in space, which is desirable consider-
ing its disappointing actual measurements. Unlike 
Maistre, I do not physically move within the newly 
arisen landscape. I rather lay still or sit upright on 
the bed, occasionally following the curiosity of my 
restless eye. In this mode, piles of clothes become 
little mountains, my wooden wardrobe changes back 
into a thick dark forest and looking over the edge of 
my bed is like looking down a plateau shaped by 
millions of years of erosion (like the Grand Canyon, 
though I’ve never seen it in real). Apart from all the 
exciting new experiences to take notice of, there is 
one that keeps returning and is incredibly frightful, 
one obtained by a desire to really see. Obtained by 
an utterly willful concentration within the focus of 
my sight. It is the gigantically overwhelming realisa-
tion that this landscape is geographically designed 
by forces that I’ll never be able to comprehend. 
Moreover, its design is brought to appearance by 
a whole universe of invisibility, a complete cosmos 
consisting of nothingness, of void. The difficult part 
is noticing the eagerness to explore this unknown 
territory, and at the same time knowing that to do 
so, to put everything in, would include the end of 
everything. One of Georges Perec’s exercises has 
a similar direction and is, I feel, because of its radi-
calism, one of his most intriguing:   
I have several times tried to think of an apartment in 
which there would be a useless room, absolutely and 
intentionally useless.… It would be a functionless 
space. It would serve for nothing, relate to nothing. 
For all my efforts, I found it impossible to follow this 
idea through to the end. Language itself, it seems, 
proved unsuited to describe this nothing, this void, 
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as if we could only speak of what is full, useful and 
functional. … how to think of nothing without auto-
matically putting something round that nothing, so 
turning it into a hole, into which one will hasten to 
put something…. The effort producing something 
that might be a statue of the inhabitable.51
Perec tries to imagine a space ‘without a function’, 
a space unlike any other previously conceived; 
not a domestic space, co-opted into the principle 
of ‘dwelling’, but a space of otherness, which is 
neither here nor there, that is simultaneously physi-
cal and mental; a purely heterotopian space. For 
example, Perec writes that a staircase is a ‘neutral 
place that belongs to all and none’ and is ‘an anony-
mous, cold, and almost hostile place’, but even this 
is a space of transit, not a null-space.52 Although a 
staircase and landing are utterly distinct from where 
the inhabitants of the apartment-building ‘entrench 
themselves in their domestic space’, it is still a 
space with a function. The inhabitable is therefore a 
space in which absence is brought within the limits 
of the conceptual.
  
 Having travelled from the formation of place, 
through our relation towards it, we end at its 
immense emptiness. At the end of everything, we 
have come to reside in a place of those things 
seemingly without meaning. 
Now in the little lounge what is left is what remains 
when there’s nothing left: Flies, for instance, 
or advertising bump slipped under the door by 
students, proclaiming the benefits of a new tooth-
paste or offering twenty-five centimes reduction to 
every buyer of three packets of washing powder, 
or old issues of Le Jouet Francais, the review he 
took all his life and to which his subscription didn’t 
run out until a few months after his death, or those 
things without meaning that lie around on floors and 
in cupboard corners.53
Perec shows that ‘those things without meaning’ 
actually have a meaning based upon their rela-
tion to the space in which they reside, instead of 
the character that owned them. While what is left 
is deemed insignificant, it has become significant 
because it had remained while there was nothing 
left. And so it seems that not only our corporality, 
but also the absence of it, gives room for a develop-
ment of meaning in intimate spatial settings. Maybe 
this is so because we cannot conceive of that which 
does not exist without somehow incorporating it into 
being. 
 In both cases above, Perec questions our 
habitual behaviour in relation to space and points 
to its unavoidable otherness. In our incapacity to 
conquer it completely, we can only take hold of the 
appearance of our attempts that take place within 
its (spatial) realm. In result I feel my own presence 
diminish in relation to its immensity and come to 
the conclusion, as expressed by Julles Valles, that: 
‘Space has always reduced me to silence’.54 
Postlude of a night scene
When seen from the inside of the place where I 
live, the process of writing this paper has been 
as much about constructing a theoretical place as 
about constructing a narrative, so too is the act of 
reading. By inhabiting the text, both the reader and I 
are involved in the construction of its meaning. The 
way we inhabit the text is not the nostalgic harmony 
of the domestic sphere, but the experience of being 
both a stranger and a friend to this place. This reali-
sation has affected my relationship with the place 
where I write this from as well. My home is built on a 
foundation of nothingness and imbued with silence. 
Structurally, both the text and my house take place 
upon a blank space and are involved with the notion 
of containing, destroying, and eradicating, through 
the presence of my conventions, any sense of the 
silence that exists at its heart. The desire to re-enter 
this place is the desire to read it and understand it, 
to appropriate it and contain the radical otherness 
that fills its corners. We wish to read something in 
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the house because we cannot tolerate its absence. 
Though, as I have tried to point out, it is not neces-
sary to turn to nomadic or ascetic forms of living 
to be able to dwell in absence, to escape from 
this sense of being limited by the way we fill it with 
concepts.
 
 A thief, who breaks out of jail in the night, over-
whelmed by the immensity and boundlessness of 
the outside world, not knowing where he is and 
where to go, can become aware of his location by 
either asking the policemen that want to re-capture 
him, or by silently waiting for the dawn. The dawn of 
the world. 
[I]n the silence, we are seized with the sensation 
of something vast and deep and boundless. It took 
complete hold of me and, for several moments, I 
was overwhelmed by the grandeur of this shadowy 
peace. This peace had a body. It was caught up 
in the night, made of night. A real, a motionless 
body.55 
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